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In a decision process (gambling or dynamic programming problem) with finite state space and 
arbitrary decision sets (gambles or actions), there is always available a Markov strategy which 
uniformly (nearly) maximizes the average time spent at a goal. if the decision sets are closed, 
there is even a stationary strategy with the same property. 
Examples arc given to show that approximations by discounted or finite horizon payoffs are 
not useful for the general average r~.~ward problem. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject of this paper is finite state, discrete time decision processes with single 
fixed goals and arbitrary decision sets (all to be defined precisely in Section 2). 
Various objective functions associated with such ?1ocesses have been studied 
extensively, among them: maximizing the probability of reaching the goal 
[7, 8, 15, 19,20]; minimizing the expected time or cost to the goal 
[4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17]; maximizing the expected total number of times at the goal 
[15]; maximizing the expected total discounted rewards at the goal [2, 6, 13, 16]; 
maximizing the probability the goal is hit infinitely often [7, 11, 19, 20]; and maximiz- 
ing the expected average time at the goal [3, 6, 10, 13, 16]. We are concerned here 
with this last objective; finite state goal problems with average reward criterion. 
In the pioneering work of Howard [141., and much of the subsequent research, 
e.g. Ross [16], the assumption of finiteness of number of gambles available at each 
point was essential, and led to constructive determinations of an optimal stationary 
strategy. If the number of gambles at some states are infinite, however, optimal 
strategies need not exist, and stationr;y strateg,es are not at all good in general. 
Ross [16, p. 144] has raised the question of determining the smallest class of strategies 
which are e-optimal for average reward problems. This problem has been studied 
by Chitashvili [3] and Fainberg [10]. It is the purpose of this paper to completely 
answer that question in the case of finite state goal problems. 
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it is shown in Theorem 1 that in every such problem with closed sets of gambles 
there always exists a stationary strategy which is uniformly e-optimal; this result is 
used to show (Theorem 2) that in the finite state goal problem with arbitrary decision 
sets there always exists a Markov strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. 
Examples are gi,,en to show that the relationship between these average reward 
problems, and problems with discounted or finite horizon objectives, isnot very close. 
2. Statements of results 
Definition 2.1. As in [4], a finite state goal problem is a triple (X, F, g), where X 
is a finite set, l" associates to each point x e X a nonempty collection F(x) of 
probability measures on X, and g ~ X is a distinguished element of X. 
The set X represents the state space or fortune space of the process, F(x) the 
actions or gambles available at the state x, and g the 'goal' state. 
Much of the notation will follow that of Dubins and Savage [7]. The Dirac 
delta-measure at x will be denoted by 8(x). A strategy is a function from finite 
sequences in X (including the empty sequence '0') to probability measures on X. 
The same symbol, o', will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability 
measure generated by ~r on the product sigma-algebra on X ~ (X  endowed with 
the discrete sigma algebra). E,,f will denote the integral of f with respect o o-. A 
strategy tr in I" at x, written ~rc F/x, is a strategy o- such that o'(&)~F(x),  and 
o'(xj . . . . .  x,,)c I'(X,,) for all xj, x., . . . .  x,, ~ X and all noN.  A strategy tr is Markov 
if cr(xl . . . .  x,,) = o'(x'l . . . . .  " whenever x',, • x,,) x,,= and is stationary if 
v-(x,, . ,  x,,) = o'(x'l . . . . .  ' whenever = x,,,. .. x,,) x,, ' The conditional strategy given 
xl . . . . .  x,,, ~rtx, . . . . .  x,], is defined by o- Ix1, . . . ,  x,](x) = o'(xl . . . . .  x,, x). For a 
function F from X to subsets of probability measures on X./~, the closure of F, is 
the function defined by F (x )= F(x) for all x, where S is the total-variation orm 
closure of the set of measures S. 
Definition 2.2. N(n) :  X '~--, {0, 1 . . . . .  n} is the function 
N( n )(xl. x.~ . . . .  ) = l{ J: 1 ~ j ~ n and xj = g}l, 
that is, the number of times the goal is visited in the first n steps of the game. 
Definition 2.3. 77~e hitting time of CcX ,  To, is defined by Tc(x~,x2 . . . .  )=  
min{/: -~i c C} if such a j exists, and = ~ otherwise. The time between the n - I st 
attd nth visits to the goal, 7",,. is defined inductively by T0 -=- 0, and 
F , ,~x , .x :  . . . .  )=min{j :  7;, j(x~,xz . . . .  )=k  andxk, i :=g} 
i[ ,~uch a i exi,,ls, and = x otherwise. 
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Definition 2.4. For a strategy tr, the expected average time at the goal using tr, A(cr). 
is defined to be A(tr)=E,,( l im sup N(n)/n),  and the maximal expected average 
time at the goal starting at state x, A(x), is A(x)= sup{A(tr): trc F/x}. 
Definition 2.5. Let A~, A2, A3 be the functions 
Al(tr) = E~ liminf(N(n)/n), A2(tr) = liminf E,~(N(n)/n) 
H n 
and 
A3(o') = limsup E,,(N(n)/n), 
n 
and similarly let 
Ai(x) = sup{Ai(tr): tr ~ I /x}.  
Remark. In most of the previous research on average reward problems the payoffs 
A2 and A3 have been used, apparently for mathematical expediency. The average 
reward criterion A(tr) defined above seems more natural to th:  authors, and in any 
event it turns out (Corollary following Theorem 2) that these criteria are equivalent 
for finite state problems. 
The following theorem, the, main result of this paper, states that in every finite 
state goal problem with closed (hence compact) sets of gambles, there always exists 
a stationary strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. 
Theorem 1. If (X, F, g) is any goal problem with [XI < oo and F(x) closed for all 
x, then for each e > 0 there is a stationary strategy or"-' in F satisfying A(tr~'[x]) 
A(x) - e for all x ~ X. 
A version of Theorem 1 for the payoff A2 is a special case of a result of Chitashvili 
[3] and one for payoff A3 is a special case of the work of Fainberg [10]. (See also 
Chapter 7 of Dynkin and Yushkevich [9].) These authors consider the general 
average reward problem for finite X and compact F(x) and exploit the relationship 
between the fl-discounted payoff and the average reward payoff. This approach 
won't work for payoff A. As the following example, which is similar to example 3 
of Bather [2], shows even if the limit of good (discounted or finite horizon) strategies 
exist, this limiting strategy may be worthles,~ in all respects. 
Example. X = {a, b, g}; 
F(g)={8(g)}, F(b)={8(b~}, 
F(a) ={~5(g)/n+ ~(b)/n2 +(1-  l /n -  1/n~)8(a): n>~l}w{~5(a)}. 
As/3 --, 1. the limit of good strategies for the/3-discounted reward problem exists, 
and in fact is the stationary strategy which uses ~5(a) at state 'a'.  Similarly for the 
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limit, as n --> ~,  of strategies which are good for the n-step problem. But using ~(a) 
always at state 'a '  will never lead to the goal. 
Theorem 2. I]" (X, F, g) is any goal problem with IX  I < o0, then for each e > 0 there 
is a Markov  strategy or" in F satis[ying A(o ' ' [x ] )  >I A ( x ) - e for all x ~ X. 
Theorem 1 and the proof of Theorem 2 yield the following corollary. 
Corol las.  If (X, 1; g) is a goal problem with IX[ <~,  then 
A(x )  = A l (x )  = A , (x )  = A~(x)  ]:or all x ~ X. 
3. Proofs 
The proof 9f Theorem 1 requires several emmas. The first is an easy exercise. 
It,emma I 
l imsup m/(  T~ +.  • • + T,,) = l imsup- -  
I ? l  ~ ~--. n - *  oC 
N(n) 
n 
Lemma 2. I f  IX[ < oo and 1" = F, then 
lim [inf{E,,( T, A M): ere l ' /x}]  = inf{E,,( T,): o" c F/x};  
here. a ^ b:= rain(a, b). 
Proof. "<-'Trivial,  since E,,(T~ ^  M)<~ E,,(T~) for all o- and all M. 
"9 '  Let limM_,~[inf{E.,( Ti ^ M)" o- c l ' /x}]  = a. If a = +oo, then we are done, so, 
suppose a < oc and fix e > 0. Note that 
inf{E,,( T~ ^  n): o-c l " /x} is nondecreasing in n, and bounded abow', by a. 
(1) 
For each n = 1.,., .  "~ .. pick or,, c l ' / x  satisfying 
E,,°( T, ^ n)< a+~.  (2) 
Since the number of finite sequences in X is countable, and F(x)  is compact for all 
x. there exists a subsequence {or,,,} and (re- I ' / x  such that 
lira ~r,,~ = oz. (3) 
~. txZ  
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Since e was arbitrary, the proof will be complete once it is shown that 
E,,(Tx) < a + 3e. (4) 
Case 1. E, , (T I )< oo. Pick M so that 
E,.( T, A M)  ~ E~,( T1) - e. (5) 
By (3) we can pick K ~> M so that 
Eo,,, ( T, A M) I> E~,( T, ^ M) - e. (6) 
Since K I> M, it follows that 
E~(  T~ AK)>~ E~,,( T~ A M) .  (7) 
Hence 
a+e>E, ,~(T l  ^ K)~> E,~K(T 1AM)>~U,,(T. ^ M) -  e ~> E, , (T , ) -  2e, 
where the inequalities follow from (2), (7), (6) and (5) respectively. This completes 
Case 1. 
Case 2. E,(T~) = a3. Pick M so that E~(/'1 ^  M)/> a + 1, and pick K/> M as in 
(6). Then 
a + e >- E~,,<(Tj A K)>~ E~(Tt  ^ M) -e  ~ E~r(Ti A M) - -ea+ l - -e  
(by (2), (7), (6) and choice of M), a contradiction for e<~.  Thus E, , (T j )<oo 
(assuming a < ce) and case 1 applies. This completes the proof. [] 
Lemma 3. Let M be finite and define T~ := T~ ^  M. I f  E,,(T'~) >1 a for all tr in F at g, 
then 
l iminf (T '~+. . .+T~,) /n>~a a.s. cr for all ~r in F at g. 
Proof. Fix or in F at g. Let Fo = {~b, X~}, and for n i> 1, let F, be the sigma-field 
generated by T'~, . . . .  T ' .  Then Yi = T[-E~,(T I JF i_ I )  is a martingale difference 
sequence satisfying IY, I <- TI ~ M almost surely. Consequently, ( I /n )  ~'=, Yi --> 0 
almost surely. Since E,,(T~IFj._~)1> a almost surely, it follows that 
liminf( T't +" • • + Ti,)/  n = liminf{(L,r( T't ! F.) +. • • + E,T( T~,IE, , ) )/ n) >1 a 
I I  ~ OC I z ~ ,3c  
Lemma 4. If ]XI < ~ and F= F, then 
limsup N(n) /n  ~ [inf{E,,( T1): o- ~ F/g}]  -I 
Pi ---~ ¢2t3 
a.s. ~r. [] 
a.s. or for all or in I" at g. 
Proof. Let inf{E,~(TI): o-~ F /g}=a.  
Case 1 a<oo.  Fix e>0.  By Lemma 2 it is possible to find MeN so that 
inf{/:',,(T1 ^ M):  tr z F /g}  >>- a - e. Now define T'i := T~ A M. We have, by Lemma 3, 
liminf(T~ +. • • + T , ) /n  >t liminf(T'l ÷. • • + T' , ) /n  >1 a - e 
/1 --~ OC? n --~ O~, 
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almost surely for all tr in F at g. Thus, by Lemma 1, 
limsup N(n)<~ (a - e) -1 (8) 
almost surely for all tr in F at g. Since e > 0 was arbitrary, the desired conclusion 
follows from ~8). 
Case 2 a = ~. "l-hen E,,(7'1) = ~ for all or ~ F/g, and it follows easily from Lemmas 
1, 2 and 3 as in Case l that l imN(n) /n=0 a.s. fo ra l lo 'eF /g .  [] 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let !nf{E,,(T~): t r~F /g}=a.  If a =+0o, then by Lemma 4 
A(g) =0 and hence A(x)=0 for all x~ X. But then every strategy, in particular 
every stationary strategy, is (trivially) optimal. 
Suppose a < oc and fix e > 0. By [4, Theorem 4.1] there is a stationary strategy 
~r ~' in i" satisfying 
E,, "'f~l(7"1) <~ a + e. (9) 
Let C c X be the closed communicating class relative ~r '~' containing (which 
is clearly recurrent). By [7, Theorem 3.9.2] there is a stationary strategy cr ~'' in F 
satisfying 
~r~"[x](T~<,x~)>~sup{o'(Tc<~):o~cF/x}-e for a l l x~X.  (10) 
Detine the stationary strategy or '~ in 1" by cr~'(x) = o'~'-'(x) if x ~ C, and = o=~"'(x) 
if x ¢ C. The remainder of the proof consists in showing that for any strategy o" in 
!" at x, or' sati,,,fies 
A(~r'[x]) ~ A(cr)--2~. (11) 
Fix ~r c I '/x. By [16, Theorem 4.7], (9), (10) and the fact that a i> 1, it follows that 
A(o- ' [x])  = er'~'"[x](Tc <~)[E,~I,~](TI)]-I>~ oJ"'[x]( Tc <c~).  a 
~>,r(T~-< ~)"  a- i -2e .  
--I 
~e  
Since A[~r~r(T~<oo) .A(g)<- - t r (T~ <~) .A(g) ,  and since 0~A~I ,  the 
inequality in t i 1) follows by l ,emma 4. This completes the proof. [] 
In Howard's treatise [14], where l '(x) is finite for all x, a 'policy-improvement" 
algorithm is given which converges to that stationary strategy which is optimal 
among all stationary strategies. Theorem 1 implies that the resulting stationary 
strategy of Howard's technique is optimal even among all strategies. 
For the proof of Theorem 2 we use 
Lemma 5. ,(f IX! < x,, then fi,r eeerv ~ c F/ x and each e > 0 there is a or ~ l"/ x with 
ii~r - d'i! ~ r. Moreoeer, (f 6" is stationary, then cr can be chosen to be Markov, 
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Proof. Fix e > 0, ;rod pick rr(0) so that I1 (0)- e(0) ll < e/2. For each finite sequence 
xl, xz, . . . ,x , ,  of elements in X, pick o ' (x l , . . . , x , )e  F(x,) so that I I~ :~r l , . . . , x , ) -  
e(xz,...,x,)ll<e/2"÷~lXI "÷~. If O is stationary, pick or(xn, . . . .  x,,) so that 
or(xn . . . .  , x,) = cr(x~,.. . ,  x ' )  whenever x, = x~. It is easy to verify that the strategy 
cr so chosen satisfies II8 -  or II < e, and is Markov if ~ is stationary. [] 
Proof of Theorem 2 completed. Fix e > 0, and let t{ be that for the problem 
(X, F, g), that is, A(x)=sup{A(or): ere F/x}. By Theorem 2 there is a stationary 
strategy or °° in/~ satisfying A(or°°[x])/> A(x ) -e  for all x e X. By Lemma 5 there 
exists a Markov strategy or" in F with ]lor"-~r'~ll<E. Since 0~<A~<fi,~ < 1, or" 
satisfies 
A(o'"[x]) >I A(o'~[x]) - e ~ fi,(x) - 2e I> Atx) - 2e 
for a l l x~X.  [] 
Proof of the Corollary. Observe that, by Fatou's Lemma, A~ <~ A2 <~ A3 ~ A. Next, 
as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can find a stationary strategy or~ in r which is 
uniformly (nearly) optimal for fi,. But for stationary strategies, lim N(n) /n  exists 
almost surely, and application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem shows 
fi, = fi,~ = A2 = fi,3. Lemma 5 implies that A = A, and Ai = A~ for i = 1, 2, 3, and this 
completes the proof. [] 
Remarks. Although A(x) = A~(x) = A2(x) = A3(x) for all x if [XI < oc, it is easy to 
see that IXl<oo does not imply A(or)=Al(or)=A2(cr)=A3(or) for all o- in F. 
However, the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there is always a Markov strategy 
which is uniformly (nearly) optimal with respect o A, A ~, A2, and A3 simultaneously. 
In fact the e-optimal strategies constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 are even easily 
seen to be persistently e-optimal [8], since uniformly good stationary strategies are 
automatically persistently good. 
4. Other reward criteria 
This paper leaves open the question of whether stationary strategies (in the 
IXt<cx~, I '=F  case) and Markov strategies (in the general IXl<oc case) are 
uniformly adequate for the more general average reward problem in which reward 
r(x) is obtained at each visit to state x. They suspect he answer is affirmative, but 
the techniques used in these proofs do rot tven c~,rry over in the special case of a 
goal set G c X (i.e. r(x) = 1 if x c G, =0 otherwise), even if F =/~. 
Example. X = {a, b, g, g'}; 
I'(a)=l(6(b)+8(g))/2}w{cS(g')}, r(b)={,3(b)}, 
r(g)={~(g)}, r(g')={~(b)}; 
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and G = |g, g'}. If one is at state a, and wishes to minimize his expected time to G, 
or maximize ihis probability of hitting G (approaches used in the above proofs), he 
uses 8(g'), which is bad for maximizing the average time in G. 
The relationship between the average reward criterion, and discounted or finite 
horizon reward payoffs seems to be rather weak, perhaps because for the average 
reward problem, a gambler is not penalized for 'resting' at neutral states for long 
periods initially, as long as he eventually makes good decisions later. In discounted, 
or finite horizon problems, on the other hand, the gambler is penalized heavily for 
staying at worthless states for long periods initially, but is not penalized much for 
making bad decisions in the distant future. Neither the e-optimal stationary strategies 
guaranteed by Blackwell's results [2] for the discounted reward problem, nor the 
e-optimal Markov strategies found by backward induction [6, 13] seemed useful in 
analyzing the average reward problem. 
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